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Abstract
Many sociological theories make critically different macropredictions when
their microassumptions are implemented stochastically rather than deter-
ministically. Deviations from individuals’ behavioral patterns described by
microtheories can spark cascades that change macrooutcomes, even when
deviations are rare and random. With two experiments, we empirically
tested whether macrophenomena can be critically shaped by random
deviations. Ninety-six percent of participants’ decisions were in line with a
deterministic theory of bounded rationality. Despite this impressive micro-
level accuracy, the deterministic model failed to predict the observed
macrooutcomes. However, a stochastic version of the same microtheory
largely improved macropredictions. The stochastic model also correctly
predicted the conditions under which deviations mattered. Results also
supported the hypothesis that nonrandom deviations can result in funda-
mentally different macrooutcomes than random deviations. In conclusion,
we echo the warning that deterministic microtheories can be misleading.
Our findings show that taking into account deviations in sociological theories
can improve explanations and predictions.
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randomness, noise, micro–macro problem, experiment, evolutionary game,
theory, formal modeling, coordination game, network
Contemporary sociology has an ambivalent relationship with the concept of
randomness. On the one hand, randomness is an integral part of statistical
models, where commonly the biggest part of a dependent variable’s variance
remains unexplained and is therefore assumed to be random. Sociological
theory, on the other hand, has been criticized for often neglecting that at least
parts of human behavior deviates from the general patterns that theories
describe (Macy and Tsvetkova 2015). This deterministic approach to socio-
logical theory is problematic because a theory “in which individual behavior
is completely determined, flawlessly executed, entirely knowable, and per-
fectly predictable is not only empirically implausible, it can also be highly
misleading” (Macy and Tsvetkova 2015:324). Deviations from general beha-
vioral patterns of individuals are of potentially critical importance whenever
individuals do not act in isolation but react to each others’ action. In such
settings, deviations can lead to behavioral reactions in actors’ social envi-
ronment, which can, in turn, motivate further behavior changes. Formal
models demonstrated that such chains of reaction can have profound impact
on the collective level, even though they might have been sparked by a
random and rare event on the individual level.
Unlike in sociology, random deviations are basic building blocks of the-
oretical models in other disciplines that study systems with a micro–macro
structure, such as physics (Nicolis et al. 1977), chemistry (Pomeau 1986),
biology (Camazine et al. 2001), traffic research (Treiber, Hennecke, and
Helbing 2000), cognitive science (Rabinovich et al. 2008), and economics
(Binmore and Samuelson 1999; Selten 1975; Harsanyi and Selten 1988). A
very prominent example are theories of biological evolution, where random
mutations in the genes of individuals generate the biological variation that
species need to adapt to changes in their environment. Similarly, the random
microscopic motion of particles (temperature) is a key ingredient of models
of turbulent fluid flows and the kinetic theory of gases (Nicolis et al. 1977).
A growing body of formal modeling work demonstrates that deviations
can also change predictions of theories explaining sociological phenomena
such as social norms (Young 2015), conventions (Young 1993), opinion
polarization (Mäs, Flache, and Helbing 2010; Pineda, Toral, and
Hernandez-Garcia 2009), cultural assimilation (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and
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Sprague 2004; Klemm et al. 2003), residential segregation (van de Rijt,
Siegel, and Macy 2009), social classes (Axtell, Epstein, and Young 2000),
collective behavior (Granovetter 1978), and the production of public goods
(Kollock 1993). One intriguing finding was, for instance, that Schelling’s
famous model of residential segregation predicts higher levels of ethnic
segregation when random deviations from Schelling’s deterministic
microassumptions are included (van de Rijt et al. 2009). According to Schel-
ling’s original model, even highly tolerant populations segregate because
every move of an actor implies that his ethnic group becomes less repre-
sented in her old neighborhood and more represented in the new neighbor-
hood. As a consequence, former neighbors of the same ethnic group and new
neighbors of the other ethnic group may also decide to move, which can, in
turn, motivate further moves. Thus, a single actor’s decision to move can
precipitate a cascade of further movings that lead the population to surpris-
ingly high degrees of ethnic segregation. It turned out that random moves can
intensify segregation because they can spark moving cascades that would not
have occurred in Schelling’s deterministic model.
So far, deviation effects have mainly been investigated from a theoretical
perspective. Empirical support for the macroeffects of microdeviations was
provided in an laboratory experiment by Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2007)
who found that information cascades are much shorter than a deterministic
rational choice model predicts. Information cascades can arise when individ-
uals with limited information make decisions in a sequence. At some point in
the sequence, decision makers rationally ignore their private information and
only respond to the decisions of those actors who decided earlier. This can
lead to a situation where all individuals rationally make the wrong choice
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992). Contrary to this deterministic
prediction, Goeree et al. observed that information cascades broke down
because participants sometimes responded to their private signal rather than
rationally following the herd.
We report here results from two empirical studies testing hypotheses
about the effects of microlevel deviations on macrooutcomes. Study 1 had
two aims. First, we tested the central notion that deviations matter, studying a
social setting where a microtheory that abstracts from deviations makes very
different macropredictions than the same microtheory with deviations. Sec-
ond, we tested whether the theoretical model with deviations accurately
identifies the conditions under which deviations matter for macrooutcomes
and when macrooutcomes are unaffected by deviations. Study 2 challenged
the assumption that deviations are random. On the one hand, the prediction
that microdeviations have macroeffects is most surprising when deviations
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are assumed to occur randomly. On the other hand, we show that sometimes
the theoretical assumption that deviations are random leads to very different
macropredictions than assumptions about systematic deviations from the
prevalent patterns of individual decision-making, even when deviations are
rare. Study 2, therefore, empirically tested whether it can be problematic to
treat deviations as random phenomena when they actually follow a pattern.
Empirically testing hypotheses about the effects of microlevel deviation on
macrooutcomes is challenging for various reasons. First, theories predict that
macroeffects of deviations are not immediate. In contrast, deviations trigger
off behavioral cascades, processes that may or may not take very long until
they translate into macroeffects. This lack of precision makes many predic-
tions immune to empirical falsification. Another problem is that deviations are
difficult to quantify, in particular when they might be random and rare. What is
more, it is very difficult to determine whether a given action constitutes a
deviation or is in line with the general behavior pattern. For instance, a white
person leaving a white neighborhood and moving into a black one does deviate
from Schelling’s model assumptions. However, a less abstract micromodel that
also takes into account actors’ budget constraints might perfectly capture this
moving decision. Thus, it often depends on the assumed micromodel whether a
given behavior is considered a deviation or not.
Confronted with these methodological challenges, we decided to study
microdeviations and their macroeffects in two controlled laboratory experi-
ments. This had two crucial advantages. First, strategically providing parti-
cipants with limited information about the behavior of others and their social
environment, we managed to create a setting where our participants made
decisions based on the so-called best-response heuristic, a simple rule of
boundedly rational decision-making (e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Netzer 2010;
Blume 1993; Fudenberg and Levine 1998; McFadden 1973; McKelvey and
Palfrey 1995; Montanari and Saberi 2010; Young 1993). We were also able
to unequivocally determine for each observed decision of our participants
whether it was a best response or a deviation. It turned out that 96 percent of
all observed decisions were best responses. Second, we were able to imple-
ment a setting where a deterministic version of the best-response model
makes different macropredictions than a version of the same microtheory
that adds random deviations. This allowed us to empirically test whether the
best-response model with deviations makes more accurate macropredictions
than a deterministic version.
Despite the artificial context of our laboratory studies, we contribute to a
debate of broad sociological relevance because any theory of social action in
the sense of Max Weber (1978) may make different macropredictions, when
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deviations are included. Whenever individuals do not act in isolation but
respond to their social environment, it cannot be excluded that deviations
spark behavioral cascades that change macropatterns. This is independent of
how complex or simple the micromodel is and does not only apply to the
best-response heuristic. In fact, the literature provides multiple examples of
prominent deterministic micromodels that were believed to explain given
macrooutcomes but actually failed to provide valid explanations when ran-
dom deviations were included (e.g., Kollock 1993; Klemm et al. 2003; Mäs
et al. 2010). Likewise, there are examples where including assumptions
about random deviations from individuals’ behavioral patterns (e.g., Mäs
et al. 2010; Pineda et al. 2009) provided new solutions to long-standing
theoretical puzzles (e.g., Abelson 1964). In the light of these strong theore-
tical reasons to take into account deviations, it is important to empirically test
the notion that deviations matter.
Random behavior is often falsely conceived as a residual component that
needs to be stripped away in order to reveal systematic behavior that allows
one to explain and predict the behavior of humans and collectives. In contrast
to this view, we argue that taking into account deviations in sociological
theories will improve explanations and predictions. Even though microlevel
deviations might be random and unpredictable, their macroeffects can be
systematic and, thus, predictable. Obviously, when individual deviations are
random, it is not possible to predict when they occur. However, there is a rich
theoretical toolbox that allows one to identify the structural conditions under
which deviations have no macroconsequences and when they have the poten-
tial to spark behavioral cascades that change macrooutcomes (Foster and
Young 1990; Freidlin and Wentzell 2012). Identifying these conditions pro-
mises to improve explanations and predictions of collective phenomena.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the following
section, we illustrate the effects of deviations in a very simple, stylized
example and show how predictions about the conditions under which
deviations matter for macropredictions can be derived. The two subsequent
sections summarize the hypotheses, the design, and the results of the two
empirical studies. We conclude with a summary of the results and an agenda
for future research.
A Stylized Example
The notion that microlevel deviations can have profound and systematic
effects on the collective level is counterintuitive, in particular when devia-
tions are random and rare. However, the following stylized example
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illustrates that deviations can have macroeffects even in a setting that is
highly simplistic and easy to analyze. To be sure, this example has not been
chosen with the motivation to study the impact of deviations on a specific
sociological phenomenon, even though very similar settings have been
explored to study the emergence and diffusion of norms and conventions
(Bicchieri 2005; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990; Ehrlich and Levin 2005;
Montanari et al. 2010; Opp 2001; Young 1993, 2015). We chose it because it
illustrates the main hypotheses that we tested and because it is possible to
implement it in a laboratory experiment, which in turn makes it possible to
directly test these hypotheses.
Consider the social network shown in Figure 1, a circle network where each
of the 20 nodes is connected to the two closest neighbors to the right and to the
left. Assume furthermore that all nodes simultaneously choose between two
options, labeled “red” and “blue” and that the position on the circle determines
the type of the network node. There are two types, which we denote here
metaphorically as “cats” and “dogs.” Cats receive P ¼ 1 money units (MU)
when choosing blue. Dogs receive the same payoff for selecting red. Further-
more, participants receive 1 MU for each network neighbor who chose the





















Figure 1. Stylized example.
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in game theory, a decision problem where actors seek to coordinate with their
interaction partners but have opposing preferences (if P > 0).
Assume furthermore that nodes make decisions based on a simple heur-
istic. When they decide between red and blue for the first time and, thus,
cannot condition their choice on the past choices of their network neighbors,
they simply choose the option that corresponds to their type (cats: blue; dogs:
red). After that, nodes choose the so-called myopic best response, which is a
simple heuristic of boundedly rational decision-making (e.g., Alós-Ferrer
and Netzer 2010; Blume 1993; Fudenberg et al. 1998; McFadden 1973;
McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; Montanari et al. 2010; Young 1993). It assumes
that participants choose the color that promises the highest payoff if the four
neighbors choose the same color as in the previous round. In other words,
actors are not hyperrational maximizers that take into account all possible
future consequences of their behavior. Actors are also not perfectly informed
about all potentially relevant aspects of the decision problem, such as the
network structure and the types of their neighbors. Actors just assume that
their neighbors will stick to their previous choices and then choose the color
that promises a higher payoff in the present round.
These microassumptions imply that dynamics can reach three Nash
equilibria, collective rest points where no individual can increase her payoff
by unilaterally changing color. The first equilibrium is called “anomic coex-
istence” and obtains when all individuals choose the color that corresponds to
their type (cats choose blue and dogs choose red, as in Figure 1). In this situation,
all actors expect to receive a payoff of Pþ 2 ¼ 3 MU when they stick to their
choice. Switching to the other color would lead to a payoff of only 2 MU. Thus,
the best response for all actors is to not change color. Second, when all
individuals choose the same color (either all red or all blue), a descriptive norm
has emerged. This is a rest point, because actors receive a payoff of either 5 MU
or 4 MU, depending on whether the network coordinated on the color that the
respective actor prefers or not. Choosing the opposite color would lead to a
payoff of either 0 or 1, which is always smaller. Thus, in a world where all actors
choose the best response, all actors would follow the descriptive norm. Third,
when P ¼ 1 also “segmented coexistence” is a rest point. Segmented coexis-
tence means that the circle is split into multiple internally coordinated but
mutually anticoordinated segments of at least five players.
Strikingly, the best-response model makes different prediction about
which equilibrium is selected by the dynamics, depending on whether devia-
tions are included or not. First, when all actors deterministically follow the
heuristic described above, then every actor chooses in the very first round the
color that corresponds to her type. In the second round, all actors realize that
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they have two neighbors who chose the same color and, thus, expect to
receive Pþ 2 ¼ 3 MU when they stick to their choice and only 2 MU when
they change color. As a consequence, best responders will not change color
and the collective rest point of anomic coexistence is reached.
Contrary to the deterministic best-response model, however, the stochas-
tic best-response model predicts the emergence of a descriptive norm when
P ¼ 1. In fact, two deviations from the best-response rule suffice to generate
a rapid shift from anomic coexistence to coordination on a descriptive norm
if P ¼ 1, as Figure 2 illustrates. The figure shows that cats choose blue and
dogs choose red at the outset. This aggregates to the collective state of
segmented coexistence, which would be an equilibrium in a deterministic
world. Let us add, however, that in period 1, actors 2 and 20 happen to deviate
from the best-response rule, choosing red instead of blue. All subsequent
decisions are best responses. Nevertheless, the system shifts from anomic
coexistence to a descriptive norm. In period 2, actors 2 and 20 will stick to
red, as this promises a payoff of 3 MU instead of only Pþ 1 ¼ 2. Furthermore,
actors 4 and 18 also choose option red, expecting to receive 3 MU. This is 1
MU more than for option blue. In period 3, actors 6 and 16 face the same
situation as 4 and 18 in the previous period and will also switch to red. This
process continues until all actors have chosen red. Thus, the two initial devia-
tions have sparked a cascade of color changes that moves along the circle until
the whole population coordinated. Two deviations are the minimum require-
ment for coordination to emerge. However, we show in the Online Appendix
that similar dynamics can unfold when the two deviations occur at maximally
distant positions in the network and at different points in time.
The collective state of a descriptive norm is more robust to deviations than
anomic coexistence. Assume, for instance, that the network coordinated on
color blue and again actors 20 and 2 happen to deviate from the best-response
rule. In the next round, the two actors will switch back to red as they expect to
receive Pþ 3 ¼ 4 MU for red and only 1 MU for blue. Actor 1, however,
will be affected by the two initial deviations. Two of her neighbors chose red
in the previous round, making her expect Pþ 2 ¼ 3 MU for red and only 2
MU for blue. However, in the following round, all of her neighbors will have
chosen blue again, motivating also actor 1 to switch back to blue. As a
consequence, the system returned to the collective state of a descriptive
norm, despite the initial deviations.
However, deviations do not always spark cascades like those illustrated in
Figure 2 and, therefore, do not always alter collective outcomes. For
instance, deviations fail to affect collective outcomes when the payoff P that
actors receive for choosing the color that corresponds to their type is
































































































































Figure 2. Example for a cascade sparked off by two deviations (P ¼ 1).
Mäs and Helbing 395
increased to 3 MU. This is a rather subtle change in the payoff structure, in
particular because anomic coexistence and descriptive norms remain rest
points. In a state of anomic coexistence, all actors expect to receive
Pþ 2 ¼ 5 MU for sticking to the color of their type, which is more than the
expected 2 MU for switching. Likewise, actors will not change color if a
descriptive norm has emerged as switching would decrease their expected
payoff to either 0 or P, which is always less than the expected payoff of
following the norm (either Pþ 4 or 4).
Under P ¼ 3, actors who deterministically follow the simple heuristic will
choose the color of their type in the first round and will then stick to this choice
forever, which aggregates to the collective pattern of anomic coexistence. This
macroprediction does not change when deviations are included. To illustrate
this, assume the same scenario as in Figure 2 where actors 20 and 2 happen to
deviate. When P ¼ 3, both actors will immediately switch back to the color of
their type, as this promises a payoff of Pþ 1 ¼ 4 MU rather than only 3 MU.
What is more, their network neighbors will be unaffected by the two devia-
tions, as choosing the color of their type remains their best response. More
deviations do not change this prediction. For instance, if in addition to actors
20 and 2, 18 and 4 happen to deviate, then actors 20 and 2 have four red
neighbors, which makes red the best response. However, actors 18 and 4 have
only three red neighbors. Thus, their best response is to switch back to their
blue. As a consequence, actors 20 and 2 also have only three red neighbors in
the next round and will, thus, also switch back to blue. In sum, the collective
will return to the pattern of anomic coexistence after only two rounds.
This simple example illustrates the two theoretical insights (Macy and
Tsvetkova 2015) that our studies put to the test. First, sometimes very few
deviations from the otherwise dominant behavioral patterns of individuals
can have profound effects on macrooutcomes. In these cases, even a micro-
theory that perfectly describes the otherwise prevalent behavioral patterns of
individuals will make false macropredictions. Second, microdeviations do
not always have macroeffects, but it is possible to derive testable hypotheses
about the conditions under which they have the potential to spark off cas-
cades that lead the system into another state.
Study 1
Study 1 put two theoretical predictions to the test. First, we tested whether
deviations on the microlevel can affect collective outcomes. Second, we
tested whether a theoretical model that includes random deviations correctly
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predicts under what conditions deviations matter and when they do not affect
macro-outcomes.
To this end, we conducted a laboratory experiment that implemented the
core aspects of the stylized example from the previous section at the Decision
Science Laboratory at ETH Zurich (https://www.descil.ethz.ch). That is, we
arranged a computer network with the structure shown in Figure 1, assigned
participants to the network nodes, and confronted them with the same deci-
sion problem as the actors in the example. Furthermore, it was critical to
create a setting for the participants that would lead them to decide based on
the best-response heuristic, the decision rule that we assumed in the previous
section. As the best-response heuristic is intuitive and simple, providing
participants with all information needed to make a best response and with-
holding crucial information necessary to form decisions based on alternative
decision rules was sufficient to create a setting where 96 percent of partici-
pants’ decisions were best responses. In this setting, we studied the two
experimental treatments that we explored in the previous section. Under
P ¼ 1, the stochastic version of the best-response model makes opposite
macropredictions than its deterministic counterpart, which allowed us to test
whether the model that takes into account deviations makes more accurate
macropredictions. Under P ¼ 3, both micromodels make the same macro-
prediction. This allowed us to test whether or not the stochastic model is able
to correctly predict when deviations matter and when they do not change
macrooutcomes.
Procedures
We invited groups of 20 participants to the laboratory, where they sat in
separate cubicles and interacted in a computer network. Every participant
of an experimental session was randomly assigned to one of the positions in
the circle network shown in Figure 1 and was instructed that per round she
would earn one MU for each interaction partner who chose the same color
and P MUs for selecting the color of their type. All experimental sessions
consisted of 150 interaction rounds, but participants were not informed
about this.
During the experiment, we always updated participants about the color
choices of their four network neighbors in the previous round, which is the
only information needed to identify the best response. We withheld further
information, to ensure that it was impossible to apply other typical decision
rules such as the imitation of successful others (Judd, Kearns, and Vorobey-
chik 2010; Kirchkamp and Nagel 2007; McCubbins, Paturi, and Weller
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2009; Selten and Apesteguia 2005) or forward-looking rules of expected
payoff maximization (Frey, Corten, and Buskens 2012). In particular, parti-
cipants were not informed about their neighbors’ payoff rules and types,
others’ payoffs, the structure of the network, and the number of interaction
periods (Hart et al. 2003).
It turned out that most of participants’ decisions were best responses. As
we studied only values of the payoff parameter P where participants cannot
be indifferent between the two color options, we could determine for every
observed decision whether it was a best response or a deviation. It turned out
that 96 percent of all participants’ decisions in studies 1 and 2 were in line
with the best-response rule, which is in line with similar experiments (Lim
and Neary 2016). In other words, for the setting of our experiments, only 4
percent of the choices deviated from the deterministic best-response rule.
The simple heuristic that we studied in the previous section furthermore
assumes that dogs would choose red and cats would choose blue in the first
found, as this guaranteed them a payoff of P. It turned out that 78 percent of
the participants did this.
Participants were recruited from a general pool of student volunteers
from ETH Zurich and the University of Zurich that was set up for beha-
vioral experiments where deception of participants is strictly forbidden. For
each of the two experimental treatments, we conducted three independent
replications with 20 participants per replication. In total, there were 120
participants in study 1. At the very beginning of the experiment, partici-
pants were informed about the payoff rules and that, at the end of the
experiment, the computer would randomly pick three rounds of the experi-
ment to determine each participant’s payoff. Participants received two
Swiss Francs for every MU earned in these three rounds. On average,
participants earned 33 Swiss Francs. All experimental sessions were
finished within one hour.
Hypotheses
Figure 3 visualizes the hypotheses that follow from the deterministic and the
stochastic versions of the best-response model, showing ideal-typical predic-
tions for each of the two experimental treatments. The figure shows only
typical predictions of the stochastic model, but in section 1.2 of the Online
Supplemental Material, we report results from large-scale simulation experi-
ments, demonstrating the dynamics shown in Figure 3 are indeed typical
outcomes of the stochastic model. The color of the markers in Figure 3 shows
actors’ color choices in the 150 periods. Squares represent best-response
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decisions and circles identify deviations. Furthermore, circle size indicates
the deviation cost, the difference in payoff for choosing the best response and
the payoff the actor actually received when deviating. Bigger circles indicate
higher deviation costs.
A  Treatment with P=1
B  Treatment with P=3

























































19 typical experimental session






















































































































Figure 3. Hypotheses derived from the deterministic and the stochastic version of
the best-response model for the two treatments of study 1.
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The top graph of each panel visualizes the hypothesis derived from the
deterministic best-response model (no deviations). As described in the pre-
vious section, the deterministic model predicts that actors will choose the
color that corresponds to their type in the first period and will then stick to
this color for the remainder of the experiment. Thus, the deterministic model
predicts the collective pattern of anomic coexistence.
To generate predictions for the best-response model with random
deviations, we adopted the standard logit-response model (Alós-Ferrer and
Netzer 2010; Blume 1993; Fudenberg et al. 1998; Montanari et al. 2010;
McFadden 1973; McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; Young 1993). This model
assumes that there is always a positive chance that agents deviate from the
best-response rule and that deviations are more likely when the payoff
difference between the two options is small. In other words, this model
assumes that deviations occur with a higher probability when they imply
small deviation costs. Formally, the probability pbluei that actor i chooses
option blue in period t is given by:
pbluei ¼
1
1þ eðbðUiðblueÞUiðredÞÞÞ ; ð1Þ
where UiðblueÞ represents the expected payoff of individual i when she
chooses blue and her network neighbors choose the same color as in the
previous period. UiðredÞ is the expected payoff of choosing red. Parameter
b models the degree to which individuals choose the best response or deviate.
For instance, b ¼ 0 models entirely random choices and b ¼ 1 implies
deterministic best-response decisions. Based on the observed decisions dur-
ing the two studies, we statistically estimated a b of 1:5 ðSE ¼ 0:02Þ. This
parameter value was also used to simulate the typical dynamics of the sto-
chastic model shown in Figure 3. However, in the Online Supplemental
Material, we report predictions of the stochastic model with less or more
deviations from the best-response model. We also compare model predic-
tions for the duration of the experiment (150 rounds) and much longer time
frames as well as different initial color distribution.
Supporting the assumption that deviations occur more frequently when
they imply smaller costs, Figure 4 shows the share of red and blue choices
depending on the deviation costs. The gray line is the estimated logistic
function (b ¼ 1:5), showing that the logit-response model is supported by
our data.1 We used this estimate to generate the ideal-typical dynamics of the
stochastic model shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 (center graph of panel A) shows that under P ¼ 1, deviations
change macropredictions even when deviations are random. The network
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started in a state of anomic coexistence but within only 20 rounds all actors
coordinated on one color, which contradicts the prediction of the determi-
nistic model. Deviations keep occurring also after the descriptive norm has
emerged, but the descriptive norm remains stable.
However, deviations do not always spark cascades. The center graph of
panel B in Figure 3 shows that under P ¼ 3, anomic coexistence remains
stable for the 150 periods of the experiment, despite the deviations (b ¼ 1:5).
Thus, for P ¼ 3, the deterministic and the stochastic best-response model
make the same macroprediction.
Several aspects of our experimental design make the hypothesis that a
descriptive norm will emerge under P ¼ 1 intuitively puzzling. First, unlike
in earlier research (Judd et al. 2010; Kearns, Suri, and Montfort 2010),
participants were not rewarded for reaching certain collective outcomes and
were never informed about the distribution of behavior in the population
(Judd et al. 2010; Kearns et al. 2010; McCubbins et al. 2009). This excludes
that any collective patterns obtained in the laboratory because participants
intended to create it. Second, participants were randomly assigned one of the
two types (cats or dogs), which were given monetary incentives for opposite
behavior. This makes coordination on one color more surprising than in
earlier experiments where all participants received the same monetary payoff
for a given behavioral option (Berninghaus, Ehrhart, and Keser 2002; Cassar
2007; Frey et al. 2012). Third, the two descriptive norms that could emerge
(all red, or all blue) implied the same collective welfare and were equally
risky. Thus, contrary to the design of earlier studies (Berninghaus et al. 2002;
Cassar 2007; Frey et al. 2012), our design made both norms equally focal
(Schelling 1960), which excluded that a norm emerged because participants
share blue share red








-7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7
payoff blue - payoff red
Figure 4. Share of red and blue choices depending on deviation costs (data from both
studies).
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independently from each other chose the most focal option. Fourth, each
participant was involved in only one realization of the experiment in order
to avoid that previous collective outcomes affected decisions and that parti-
cipants learned to create or avoid a certain collective outcome. Finally, the
networks that we studied were perfectly symmetric, excluding that some
participants had a greater impact on the collective dynamics, for example,
because of a more central position in the network (Frey et al. 2012; Judd et al.
2010; Kearns et al. 2010).
What is more, the hypothesis that a descriptive norm will emerge under
P ¼ 1 is risky, as it is built on two implicit but crucial assumptions. First, the
model specified in Equation (1) assumes that actors do not condition their
behavior on whether the choices of their network neighbors were deviations
or not. It appears plausible, however, that a participant who observes a color
change by a network neighbor reasons that this color change resulted, for
example, from a mistake and might therefore decide to not change color
herself even if this would have been the best response. Such behavior would
challenge the prediction of the stochastic model, as it would prevent that
deviations spark cascades that change macrooutcomes. Second, our predic-
tions will be challenged when deviations are not random but follow specific
patterns. The fact that each respondent had a financial interest in one of the
two colors implies that respondents may strategically rather than randomly
deviate from the best-response model. For instance, participants on cat posi-
tions who realize that their neighbors tend to choose red, the color that dogs
prefer, might strategically deviate, choosing blue even though red would be
the best response. These participants would give up short-term payoffs in
order to harvest long-term payoffs arising from the collective pattern that is
most profitable for themselves. Such systematic deviations would make the
coordination on one color unlikely and, thus, challenge the hypothesis
derived from the stochastic model.
Results
The empirical results of study 1 clearly confirmed the hypotheses derived
from the stochastic model. For comparison with the hypotheses derived from
the two theoretical models, the bottom graphs of the two panels in Figure 3
show a typical experimental session from the respective treatment. The
Online Appendix contains the same graphs for the remaining sessions.
In all three replications with P ¼ 1, anomic coexistence was found only at
the beginning of the dynamics. Contrary to the predictions of the determi-
nistic best-response model, all experimental populations coordinated quickly
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on one of the two colors. These descriptive norms were stable until the
experiment ended, as predicted by the stochastic model. The experiment also
confirmed that anomic coexistence is much more stable under P ¼ 3. In all
three replications under this condition, anomic coexistence was found
throughout the 150 periods of the experiment, showing that deviations do
not always change macropatterns and that the stochastic model correctly
predicted when the collective pattern is unstable or not.
Figure 5 reports the statistical tests of the macropredictions. To quantify
which macropattern emerged, we measured the size of the biggest cluster in
the network. A cluster was defined as a set of nodes with adjacent positions
on the circle that chose the same color at a given point in time. This measure
adopts a value of 1 when the system is in a state of anomic coexistence and
adopts its maximal value of 20 when a descriptive norm has emerged.
The green bars in Figure 5 show the average size of the biggest cluster in
the network as predicted by the deterministic best-response model. We have
shown in Figure 3 that the deterministic best-response model predicts the
pattern of anomic coexistence when all participants initially choose the color
of their type. However, when some individuals happen to choose the opposite
color in the very first round, then the deterministic best-response model may
make slightly different macropredictions. For instance, it is possible that the
system happens to start in a collective state of segmented coexistence, which
is also an equilibrium (see section 2). To exclude that our statistical test is
affected by this, we simulated the deterministic best-response dynamics that
follow from the initial color choices observed during the respective sessions
of the experiment. The size of the green bars, thus, shows the average size of





















Figure 5. Test of the hypotheses derived from the deterministic and the stochastic
model.
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error bars were obtained with linear multilevel models to control for the
nestedness of observations in the three experimental sessions. The red bars
show average size of the biggest cluster in the network at the final (150th)
round in 1,000 independent simulations with the stochastic model, assum-
ing b ¼ 1:5. In section 1.2 of the Online Supplemental Material, we show
that predictions of the probabilistic model are robust to changes in b. Also
these simulations started with the initial color distribution observed during
the experiment.
Gray bars show the average outcome in the final 100 periods of the
experiment. Estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals were obtained
with linear multilevel models, controlling for the nestedness of observations
in experimental sessions.2
Figure 5 shows that the experiment confirmed the macrohypothesis
derived from the stochastic best-response model for the treatment with
P ¼ 1 and, thus, did not support the deterministic model. This supports the
theoretical notion that deviations on the level of individuals can have a deci-
sive impact on collective outcomes. A micromodel that takes into account
deviations makes, thus, more accurate macropredictions than a deterministic
version of the same model, even when deviations are assumed to be random.
What is more, deviations do not always change macro-outcomes, but the
stochastic model correctly predicted when deviations matter.
Study 2
Study 1 provided empirical support for the notion that the macropredictions
of a microtheory can become more accurate when deviations are taken into
account. On the one hand, this finding challenges intuition because we
assumed that deviations occur randomly. On the other hand, the assumption
that deviations are random might also be problematic, as Figure 6 suggests.
Figure 6 shows examples of seemingly systematic deviation patterns that
we observed in the two studies. In example a, participant 15 attempted to
enforce her preferred color (see Online Appendix Figure S19). Even though
blue would have been the best response, this participant kept choosing red,
the color of her type. In example b, participant 6 seemed to have attempted to
disrupt the descriptive norm that had emerged, systematically deviating sev-
eral times (see Online Appendix Figure S21). In example c, participant 9
attempted to conserve her preferred color (see Online Appendix Figure S19).
Furthermore, example d suggests that participants who observed that a net-
work neighbor changed color might have deviated with an increased prob-
ability, generating small deviation chains (see Online Appendix Figure S14).
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Study 2 was designed to test the hypothesis that systematic, nonrandom
deviations can lead to very different macropatterns than random deviations,
even when deviations are rare. In study 1, deviation patterns occurred but did
not affect the dynamics to a degree that macrooutcomes differed from the
predictions of the micromodel with random deviations, which suggests that
adding stochasticity suffices to improve macropredictions even when devia-
tions are not entirely random but follow patterns that are not captured in the
microtheory. However, there might be conditions under which systematic
deviations generate dynamics that differ from those generated by random
deviations. We therefore tested whether it may be misleading to assume that
deviations are random if they are actually systematic.
Study 2 differed from study 1 only in one aspect, the structure of the inter-
action network. In study 1, participants were linked to the two closest neighbors
to their left and to their right, which created a mixed network where nodes have
two neighbors of the same type and two neighbors of the opposite type. For study
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Figure 6. Observed deviation patterns.
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two neighbors with a distance of two, as Figure 7 shows. The resulting network
is very similar to the network of study 1, but actors are connected only to actors
of the opposite type. Like in study 1, we studied two treatments with different
values of parameter P. We conducted three independent replications with P ¼ 1
and four with P ¼ 3. In total, there were 140 participants.
Predictions
Similar to the settings of study 1, coordination on a descriptive norm and
segmented coexistence are also rest points in study 2, but there is a third very
important stable pattern, which we call “dynamic oscillation.” This is a
dynamic pattern where cats and dogs always choose opposite colors but also
swap color in every period. This pattern is stable in that switching is always the
best response to the choices of one’s interaction partners in the previous round.
The fact that best-response behavior generates dynamic oscillation is
important, as it allowed us to study collective outcomes when decision mak-
ers deviate systematically from the best-response rule. When a participant
applies the best-response rule, she assumes that the interaction partners will





















Figure 7. Network used in study 2.
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system is the dynamic-oscillation phase and color choices alternate every
round. As the participants of our experiment were always informed about the
past choices of their network neighbors, we expected that they would system-
atically deviate from the best-response model whenever the system was in a
state of dynamic oscillation.
Figure 8 visualizes the predictions of the deterministic and the stochastic
(b ¼ 1:5) versions of the best-response model for the two treatments of study
2. For the treatment with P ¼ 1, both theoretical models predict that the
populations will end up in a state of dynamic oscillation. When dogs choose
red and cats choose blue in the first round, then nobody coordinates with any
of her neighbors, leading to a payoff of only P for everybody. Switching
color in Round 2, however, promises a payoff of four MU, which motivates
all individuals to change color. In the subsequent round, however, decision
makers realize again that they countercoordinated with their neighbors and
that their payoff is even smaller (zero MU). As another color change pro-
mises a payoff of Pþ 4, everybody changes back to the initial color. Thus,
the deterministic best-response model predicts that individuals will switch
color until infinity. With random deviations, as assumed by the stochastic
best-response model (equation [1]), the state of collective oscillation is stable
for the duration of the experiment when P ¼ 1, as the center graph of panel A
shows. That is, even when actors sometimes happen to deviate from the best-
response rule, the collective pattern of dynamic oscillation remains stable.
However, even though both the deterministic and the stochastic best-
response model predict the collective pattern of dynamic oscillation when
P ¼ 1, we expected this collective pattern to be very fragile and to disappear
quickly. As just described, it is not plausible that participants apply the best-
response rule when the system is in a state of dynamic oscillation. Therefore,
we expected participants to systematically deviate whenever the system is in
a state of dynamic oscillation and that dynamics would lead the systems into
one of the other equilibrium candidates, either coordination on a descriptive
norm or on a segmented coexistence. Segmented coexistence is stochasti-
cally very unstable, however. In fact, a single deviation by any member of a
segment who has a network connection to another segment member who is of
the type that does not prefer the color of the segment and who is connected to
a node outside the segment will motivate these contacts to also change color.
Coordination on one of the two colors is stochastically much more stable. If,
for instance, the network coordinated on red and a dog happens to deviate,
then even the four connected cats (who prefer blue) will stick to red, as red
promises a payoff three and blue only a payoff of Pþ 1 ¼ 2. As a conse-
quence, the system will return to the state of coordination.
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In sum, for the treatment with P ¼ 1, the deterministic and the stochastic
version of the myopic best-response model predict the pattern of dynamic
oscillation. However, if our intuition is correct that sometimes systematic
deviations can generate different macro-outcomes than random deviations,
A  Condition with P=1
B  Condition with P=3
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Figure 8. Predictions and typical results for the two experimental treatments of study 2.
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then we would observe coordination on a descriptive norm in the treatment
with P ¼ 1.
For the treatment with P ¼ 3, the deterministic and the stochastic best-
response model make opposite predictions, as Figure 8 illustrates. The deter-
ministic model predicts the pattern of dynamic oscillation, like under P ¼ 1.
According to the stochastic model, however, random deviations lead to
recurrent phase transitions from dynamic oscillations to segmented coexis-
tence to coordination and back (see center graph of panel B in Figure 8). If an
actor deviates in a period with an even number, then all of her contacts will
stop alternating, as this promises a payoff of 1þ P ¼ 4, rather than only 3
MU. If the actor who just deviated sticks to his last color choice, which would
also be a deviation, then the system has reached a new equilibrium (segmen-
ted coexistence). However, segmented coexistence is also stochastically very
unstable, as a deviation by any segment member will motivate other segment
members of also change color. Segments can also grow until the whole
network coordinated on one color, however, as a result of further deviations.
Strikingly, also coordination is stochastically unstable when P ¼ 3. For
instance, if everybody coordinated on option red and a dog happens to
deviate, then her four neighbors will also change color. If the dog who just
deviated sticks to his past choice, which would be a deviation, then a new
equilibrium is reached (segmented coexistence). If, however, the dog who
deviated chooses the best response after the deviation (red), then the segment
of five actors will start the oscillation pattern.
The recurrent phase transitions that the best-response model with ran-
dom deviations generates are intriguing. However, if our intuition is correct
that participants will deviate systematically from the best-response rule
whenever the system is in a state of dynamic oscillation, then the following
prediction can be formulated. The system will start in dynamic oscillation,
but systematic deviations will drive it into another equilibrium (either
coordination or segmented coexistence). But also these equilibria are
unstable and the system will keep switching from coordination to segmen-
ted coexistence. Phases of dynamic oscillation will be very short, as they
lead to systematic deviations.
Results
The two bottom graphs in the two panels of Figure 8 show typical dynamics
from the experiment, showing that our experimental results supported our
prediction that nonrandom deviations can generate different collective pat-
terns than random deviations. Challenging the predictions of both the
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deterministic and the stochastic best-response model, participants coordi-
nated quickly on one of the two colors in all three replications for P ¼ 1.
Likewise, we observed only very short phases of oscillation in the four
replications for P ¼ 3. In line with the predictions of the stochastic best-
response model, participants coordinated on one color. However, this
happened much faster than the stochastic model predicted, which provides
further support for our assumption that dynamic oscillation leads to systema-
tic deviations. Nevertheless, in agreement with the stochastic best-response
model, coordination was unstable when P ¼ 3. In one of the four replications
(the one shown in Figure 8), the descriptive norm broke down as a result of
a deviation and the system entered a state of segmented coexistence.
Figure 9 reports the same statistical tests as those from study 1, but the
result is very different. Unlike in study 1, both best-response models fail to
explain the macropatterns observed in the two treatments of the experiment.
In addition, the analyses reported in section 1.2 of the Online Supplemental
Material show that also a stochastic model with more of less deviations
would not have explained the empirically observed dynamics. In a nutshell,
the results of study 2 challenged the standard assumption that deviations are
random. Systematic deviation has the potential to lead systems into different
collective states than random deviations.
Discussion
The notion that the behavior of individuals can lead to complex and unex-




















Figure 9. Test of the hypotheses derived from the deterministic and the stochastic
model.
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with each other is, in a nutshell, sociology’s contribution to the understand-
ing of human behavior. Formal models of social processes and theories from
other disciplines suggest that in these settings, even rare and random devia-
tions can have decisive impact on how microbehavior translates into macro-
patterns. Under conditions that theoretical methods allow to identify (Foster
and Young 1990; Freidlin and Wentzell 2012), deviations may spark cas-
cades that have a substantial impact on collective behavior. To test this
notion, we conducted two laboratory experiments.
Our empirical studies support the notion that microdeviations matter for
macrooutcomes. We draw three conclusions from our empirical results. First,
our findings support the notion that even micromodels that very well capture
the prevalent patterns of individual behavior can make false macropredic-
tions. Deviations from the patterns that microtheories describe can spark
behavioral cascades that profoundly change collective outcomes. Second,
the stochastic model correctly predicted the conditions under which devia-
tions have the potential to alter macrooutcomes, even when deviations are
assumed to be random and, thus, unpredictable. Third, when individuals
deviate in a systematic way from otherwise prevalent patterns of behavior,
the resulting macrooutcomes can differ substantially from those generated
by random deviations. In other words, even in settings where deviations are
rare, it can be misleading to assume that deviations are random if they
actually follow a pattern. Including random deviations may thus fail to
improve macropredictions if the modeler failed to take into account an
important deviation pattern. Stochasticity improves macropredictions of
accurate microtheories, but it does not necessarily fix the predictions of
false micromodels.
Future research on the stochastic component of individual behavior is
crucial. Two main challenges lie ahead. First, more theoretical and empirical
work on the conditions of stochastic instability is needed in order to under-
stand better why and when the stochastic component of individual behavior
alters collective dynamics. Crucial methodological tools to analyze the sto-
chastic stability of social systems (Foster and Young 1990; Freidlin and
Wentzell 2012) have been developed, and their usefulness has been demon-
strated on social processes such as the evolution of conventions and norms
(Young 2015, 1993), the spread of innovation (Montanari et al. 2010; Young
2011), the emergence of hierarchies (Axtell et al. 2000), the polarization of
opinions (Mäs et al. 2010; Pineda et al. 2009), and residential segregation
(van de Rijt et al. 2009). Empirical studies are needed to test whether sto-
chastic models outperform deterministic theories also in these contexts. Our
studies have demonstrated that laboratory experiments are a useful approach
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to testing hypotheses about deviation effects. The core advantage of labora-
tory studies is that they allow the researcher to measure whether a given
action was a deviation or not. An important challenge for future empirical
research will be to study deviation effects in the field (an inspirational exam-
ple is the study by Chadefaux 2016).
Second, far too little is known about the conditions of deviations (But-
ler, Isoni, and Loomes 2012; Freidlin and Wentzell 2012; Goeree et al.
2005; McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; Loomes 2005; Lim and Neary 2016;
Wilcox 2008; Naidu, Hwang, and Bowles 2010; Hwang et al. 2014; Pra-
delski and Young 2012). Deviations have been argued to have multiple
sources including mistakes, misperceptions, inertia, or trial-and-error
experiments. These forms of deviations have been incorporated in very
different ways into formal models, which can matter for macropredictions.
One important assumption, for instance, is that deviations occur with a
constant rate (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 1993; Young 1993), which might
be a good model of deviations resulting from mistakes. Deviations result-
ing from trial-and-error experiments, however, might be better captured by
the logit-response model (Alós-Ferrer and Netzer 2010; Blume 1993; Elli-
son 1993; Young 1998, 2011), as it seems plausible that actors experiment
more likely when it involves low costs. Our studies support the logit-
response model (see Figure 4), but more research is needed to identify the
conditions under which alternative deviation models offer more or less
accurate descriptions of real deviations (Mäs and Nax 2016). It is impor-
tant to point out, however, that from the view of a sociologist interested in
macrophenomena, it is certainly not necessary to develop complex devia-
tion theories seeking to predict individual deviations. Study 1 illustrated
that often even very simple deviation models, such as the logit-response
model, suffice to improve macropredictions. What is needed, however, are
theories that point to the conditions under which deviations are more or
less likely.
Our experimental design was very much tailored to the best-response
heuristic, which is just one of the many candidates for a micromodel. Nev-
ertheless, there is no reason to expect that deviations do not have similar
macroeffects when actors apply even simpler or more complex decisions
rules. For instance, theoretical models predict deviation effects when actors
also use simple reinforcement-learning heuristics (Pradelski and Young
2012) or imitate successful others (Kandori et al. 1993). In fact, cascades
can be sparked whenever decision makers are influenced by the behavior of
others. One can be certain that deviations are irrelevant for collective out-
comes, only when actors act in perfect isolation.
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Notes
1. A detailed analysis of the microlevel deviations during our two experiments has
been published by Mäs et al. (2016). These analyses provided support for the logit-
response model.
2. The simulated dynamics of the deterministic and the stochastic model that started
with the initial color choices observed during the experiment are also reported in
the Online Appendix.
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